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L Facts
Harris Thomas Stone ("Stone") was found dead at his residence around
2:00 a.m. on Sunday, November 3, 1985. There was no sign of a struggle
nor was any blood observed on Stone's body, but his wallet was missing.
The medical examiner examined the body that morning and noted an
abrasion on the chest, but drew no conclusions based upon that evidence.
The examiner concluded that Stone died of heart failure. The results of a
blood alcohol content test revealed Stone's content to be .41%; this caused
the Roanoke medical examiner's office to amend the cause of death to blood
alcohol poisoning. The next day, the funeral director, Jack Miler
("Miller"), observed a bruise over the left rib cage of Stone's body and
alerted the police. The medical examiner dismissed the bruise as an old one
and Miller embalmed the body.1
Approximately six months later, Danville's chief of police received an
anonymous letter from a local jail inmate in which the author admitted
killing Stone. Police discovered that Terry Williams ("Williams") wrote the
letter and Williams later gave multiple confessions to the murder and
robbery of Stone. Williams said that Stone would not give Williams money,
so he struck Stone on the chest and back with a mattock. Williams took
Stone's wallet and removed three dollars. Stone's body was exhumed and
an autopsy was performed. The autopsy revealed that two ribs on the left
side had been broken and punctured the left lung allowing blood into the
left chest cavity, causing Stone's death.2
A jury convicted Williams on September 30, 1986, of capital murder
in the Circuit Court of the City of Danville. At the sentencing phase of the
trial, the jury recommended that Williams be sentenced to death based upon
finding the aggravator of future dangerousness.' On direct appeal, the
1. Williams v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 361, 363 (Va. 1987).
2. Id. at 364. In an appeals affidavit, a medical examiner from Georgia said that it was
impossible to determine that the death resulted from the mattock. The examiner said that
the pierced lungs could have resulted from defective embalming. A neighbor, who did not
testify at trial, saw Stone fall on some concrete steps on the evening of his death. Frank
Green, Life or Death? Danville Case Poses Key Question for High Court, RICH. TIMES-DIS-
PATCH, Jan. 8, 2000, at Al.
3. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1500 (2000); see VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-
264.4(C) (Michie 2000) (establishing penalty of death may only be imposed if the Common-
wealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt, at sentencing, that the defendant presents a
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Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Williams's conviction and death sen-
tence.' The United States Supreme Court denied Williams's petition for a
writ of certiorari.' Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Danville Circuit Court on August 26, 1988. The court held a hearing
and dismissed the majority of Williams's claims. Seven years later, Williams
amended his habeas petition in the circuit court to include several claims
that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court of Virginia
subsequently assumed jurisdiction, but requested that the circuit court issue
findings of fact and legal recommendations to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia.6 In June 1995, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the
new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court found that
the conviction was valid, but that the sentencing was infirm because counsel
did not present essential mitigating evidence. The circuit court forwarded
its findings to the Supreme Court of Virginia.!
On June 6, 1997, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the lack of
mitigating evidence did not prejudice the defendant under Strickland v.
Washington, and rejected the recommendation of the circuit court." The
court also relied upon Lockbart v. FretwelP0 to find that the trial judge erred
in his prejudice analysis by not inquiring into the fundamental fairness of
the sentence. " The court concluded that there was not a reasonable probab-
probability of future danger to society or that his conduct was vile).
4. Williams, 360 S.E.2d at 371.
5. Williams v. Virginia, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988).
6. Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194, 195-96 (Va. 1997). The case was transferred
to the Supreme Court of Virginia pursuant to a 1995 Amendment to Virginia Code 5 8.01-
654, which added subsection (C). See VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-654(C)(1) (Michie 2000) (With
respect to [a habeas] petition filed by petitioner held under the sentence of death.., the
Supreme Court [of Virginia] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to consider and award writs ofhabeas corpus.").
7. Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 864 (4th Cir. 1998).
8. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
9. Williams, 163 F.3d at 864-65; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)
(providing that a defendant was prejudiced if there is a "reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different").
10. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
11. Williams, 487 S.E.2d at 198; see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993)
(finding that "an analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention
to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally fair or unreliable, is defective").
The Court cited this as error because the Supreme Court of Virginia relied upon
Lockhart. Specifically, in Part IV of its opinion, the Court said that Lockbart does not justify
a departure from a straightforward application of Strickland when the ineffectiveness of
counsel does deprive the defendant of a substantive or procedural right to which the law
entites him. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1513. The Court implied that if an individual instance
of poor lawyering does not amount to ineffectiveness, there is the possibility of the court
finding ineffective assistance of counsel based on cumulative deficiencies of trial counsel. The
Supreme Court conclusion rejects the Fourth Circuit's proposition in Fisher v. Angelone that
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ility that the presentation of the mitigating evidence would have affected the
jury's sentencing recommendation."
Williams then filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254.13 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, after reviewing the state habeas documents, agreed with
the circuit court that the sentence imposed was constitutionally infirm. The
court went to great lengths to identify the degree and volume of mitigating
evidence that trial counsel omitted. The state court records revealed that
trial counsel did not introduce the following: (1) evidence that Williams
was abused by his father; (2) testimony of correctional officers who would
testify that Williams was not a danger while incarcerated; (3) prison com-
mendations for Williams's assistance in breaking up a drug ring and return-
ing a warden's wallet; (4) character witnesses; (5) evidence that Williams was
borderline mentally retarded; and (6) juvenile records of the Williams's
home in reprehensible conditions with feces, urine, and trash on the floor,
filthy children, and intoxicated parents and children.14 The district court
flatly rejected the contention that the decision not to introduce this evi-
dence was strategic."5 The court held that the Supreme Court of Virginia's
finding that Lockhart modified Strickland was erroneous. 6 The district
court further held, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1), that the Supreme
Court of Virginia's decision was "contrary to" or "an unreasonable applica-
tion of" federal law.'
The Commonwealth appealed and Williams cross-appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The-ourth Circuit
held that the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision on the issue of prejudice
deficient attorney conduct cannot be cumulated to find ineffective assistance of counsel.
Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (1998) (providing that an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim may only be made for single act of ineffective lawyering).
12. Widliams, 120 S. Ct. at 1502.
13. Id.; see Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,§ 104,
110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. S 2254 (Supp. II 1997)).
14. Widliams, 120 S. Ct. at 1502 n.4. Williams has an IQ of 69, and may suffer from
fetal alcohol syndrome due to his mother's admitted drinking during her pregnancy with
Williams. Green, supra note 2, at Al.
15. Wdliams, 120 S. Ct. at 1502.
16. Id. The district court specifically ruled that the Supreme Court of Virginia's
application of Strickland and Lockbart was unreasonable because Lockbart did not modify the
prejudice standard and also held that the Supreme Court of Virginia made an important error
of fact in assessing prejudice: "The Virginia Supreme Court ignored or overlooked the
evidence of Williams' difficult childhood and abuse and his limited mental capacity." Id. at
1502 n.5.
17. Id. at 1502-03; see 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) (Supp. II 1997) (barring a grant of writ of
habeas corpus unless the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law
or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law).
20001
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was not an unreasonable application of Strickland or Lockhart." The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the standard of review under 28 U.S.C. S
2254(d)(1) prohibited the grant of habeas relief unless the state court decided
the question by interpreting or applying the relevant precedent in a manner
that all reasonable jurists would agree is unreasonable? The Fourth Circuit
relied on the "overwhelming evidence" of future dangerousness to find that
Williams did not suffer prejudice."0 Upon petition, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.21
II. Holding
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial
court for a new sentencing proceeding.' The Court found that Williams's
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated and the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia in refusing to set aside his death
sentence was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States."
23
IlL Analysis lApplication in Virginia
The Court's holding on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a
standard application of the Strickland prejudice test and does not reveal a
new approach or analysis. The import of this case surrounds the applica-
tion and interyretation of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 ( AEDPA"), which amended 28 U.S.C. S 2254 to change the
standard for federal review of a habeas petition by a state prisoner." De-
fense attorneys must be acutely aware of the connotations and interpreta-
tions which accompany the federal standard of review of habeas petitions
in order to present an effective argument for the grant of a habeas petition.
A. AEDPA Effects Two Independent Inquiries
The Court's opinion on the proper interpretation of the language of
AEDPA is found in Part II of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Justice
18. Williams, 163 F.3d at 865.
19. Id. (quoting Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865,870 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that "habeas
relief is authorized only when the state courts have decided the question by interpreting or
applying the relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is
unreasonable")).
20. Id. at 868.
21. Williams v. Taylor, 526 U.S. 1050 (1999).
22. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1516.
23. Id. at 1499 (quoting 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) (Supp. El 1997)).
24. The language in 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) effects the change in standard of review,
permitting a grant of a petition for writ of habeas corpus only when the state court proceed-
ing "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1).
[Vol. 13:1
WILLIAMS (TERRY) V. TA YLOR
O'Connor asserts that Justice Stevens's interpretation of AEDPA in his
concurring opinion does not institute a new standard of review, but rather
retains the previous rule of plenary review of the state court's decision.2"
Justice Stevens's construction of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) requires "careful
weighing" of the state court's decision and a grant of a habeas petition rests
upon the "independent judgment" of the federal court.26 The standard for
pre-AEDPA habeas review is found in Miller v. Fenton27 and the Court
contends that it closely mirrors Stevens's approach.28 Miller construed the
federal court's role in review of a habeas petition of a state prisoner as an
"independent federal determination." 29 The Court asserted that Congress
intended to institute habeas reform to prevent retrials, to give effect to state
convictions, and to curb delays. Therefore, Congress did not amend 28
U.S.C. S 2254 in order to replicate the present federal standard of review."0
The Court thoroughly addressed the rule of statutory construction, which
mandates that every word of a statute be given effect.
The Court concluded that the language of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1)
dictated an independent inquiry for both the "contrary to" clause and
"unreasonable application" clause."' Concerning the first inquiry, the Court
adopted the common understanding of the word"contrary": "diametrically
different ... opposite in character or nature ... or mutually opposed."
The Court found that the decision of the state court is "contrary to" federal
law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set
forth in Supreme Court cases." The state court decision is also "contrary
to" federal law if the state court confronts a set of facts that are indistin-
guishable from a previous decision of the United States Supreme Court and
yet arrives at a result different from that arrived at in the precedent.'
25. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1518.
26. Id. at 1511.
27. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
28. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1518; seeMiller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985) (requiring
that the federal court "should, of course, give great weight to the considered conclusions of
a coequal state judiciary").
29. Miller, 474 U.S. at 112.
30. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1518.
31. Id. at 1519; see 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) (-An application for a writ of habeas corpus
on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceed-
ings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, dearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; .. .
32. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1519.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1520.
2000]
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, proceeded to identify a body
of cases in which the proper legal rule was applied yet the state court
decision was not correct. The Court asserted that this body of cases does
not fit within the rubric of the "contrary to" clause."5 As a result, the Court
refused to.adopt Justice Stevens's broad construction of the "contrary to"
clause because it blurred the lines of the two inquiries in the statute, render-
ing the "unreasonable application" language a "nullity."6 A state court
decision warrants a grant of habeas relief because of an "unreasonable
application" of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing
legal rule, but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular prisoner's
case.'7 The state court decision is also an "unreasonable application" of
federal law if it either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new
context to which it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend a
principle to a new context in which it should apply.'
B. The Fourth Circuit Erroneously Applied the "Reasonable Jurist" Standard
The Fourth Circuit in Williams erroneously employed the Green
construction of the "unreasonable application" clause of 28 U.S.C. S
2254(d)(1).39 According to the Fourth Circuit, a state court decision is an
unreasonable application of federal law if applied "in a manner that all
reasonable jurists would agree is unreasonable." The Court dismissed this
interpretation of the clause as unworkable and misleading. The Fourth
Circuit's construction of the clause directs federal courts down the winding
road of subjective inquiry rather than the direct path of an objective in-
quiry. The "reasonable jurist" standard erroneously focuses on the minds
of jurists and their interpretations of a state court's decision."
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion continued at some length to
delineate what "unreasonable application" is not.42 Primarily, the Court
35. Id.
36. Id. ("On the other hand, a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applyig the correct
legal rule from our cases to the facts of a prisoner's case would not fit comfortably within S
2254(d)(1)'s 'contrary to clause'... Justice Stevens would construe S 2254(d)(1)'s 'contrary
to' clause to encompass such a state-court decision. That construction, however, saps the
'unreasonable application' clause of any meaning.").
37. Id.; see also Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998).
38. Wilams, 120 S. Ct. at 1519.
39. Wdliams, 163 F.3d at 865.
40. Id.; see Green, 143 F.3d at 870.
41. Widliams, 120 S. Ct. at 1521-22 ('The federal habeas court should not transform the
inquiry into a subjective one by resting its determination instead on the simple fact that at
least one of the Nation's jurists has applied the relevant federal law in the same manner the
state court did in the habeas petitioner's case.").
42. Id. at 1522 ("Under S 2254(d)(1)'s 'unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal
habeas court may not issue the writ simply because'that court concludes in its independent
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belabored the point to ensure a clear distinction between a decision that is
simply wrong and one that is unreasonable. 3 The Court's opinion stressed
the actual language of the statute and the congressional intent of the words
chosen. Congress did not elect to make the inquiry into the state court
decision one of whether the court was "erroneous" or "incorrect," but
rather required that the state court decision evidence "unreasonable appli-
cation" of federal law." The distinction is evidenced by the Court's debate
in Wright v. West.4 The opinions of Justice Thomas and Justice O'Connor
in that case reiterate the delineation that the Court and Congress desired be
present between an incorrect state court decision and an unreasonable one.'
It is necessary to be aware that this case does not merely concern the
semantics of a statute. The great pains with which the Court construed 28
U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) is representative of a greater tension between the sover-
eignty of the states versus the power of the federal government over the
several states. The portion of AEDPA that amended 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1)
was intended to, among other things, "give effect to state convictions to the
extent possible under the law."47 Justice Stevens's opinion broadly con-
strued the statute by interpreting the language to permit federal courts'
independent review of state habeas adjudications."' This approach grants
the federal courts a broader scope of review and therefore greater power to
overturn a state court's decision. Conversely, Justice Rehnquist, by nar-
rowly interpreting the "unreasonable application" clause, gave a greater
degree of deference to the state court's habeas adjudication and independ-
ence from federal interference.' It is important for the attorney to be
aware of the jurisprudential backdrop the federal court may have in mind
while reviewing a state adjudication of a habeas petition.
C. Expansion of Teague
The Court interpreted "dearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court" to be a further development of the standard set
forth in Teague v. Lane.' The Court in Teague held that a federal court may
judgment that the relevant state court decision applied dearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly.*).
43. - Id. at 1523.
44. Id. at 1522.
45. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,287 (1992) (criticizing the Court's prior "satisfactory
conclusion" test because it did not answer whether the 'satisfactory conclusion'" of the state
court was determined correct by the federal court or just not unreasonable).
46. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1522.
47. Id. at 1509 (Stevens, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 1511 (Stevens, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 1525-27 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. Id. at 1523; see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (establishing that federal
2000]
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not use a rule that broke new ground or imposed a new obligation on the
states after the prisoner's state court conviction."' In furthering the analysis,
the Court said that whatever would qualify as an "old rule" under the
Teague test will constitute "clearly established Federal law" under 28 U.S.C.
S 2254(d)(1).52 AEDPA took another step in defining "clearly established
Federal law" as it restricted the body of jurisprudence from which the
federal courts may draw to review a state habeas petition to that of the
United States Supreme Court. 3 Justice Stevens's concurring opinion went
one step further and argued that the AEDPA actually codified Teague to the
extent that it required federal court to deny habeas relief if it is contingent
upon a rule of law that was not clearly established at the time of the state
conviction.5' The "new rule" test of Teague is the functional equivalent of
the statutory provision commanding exclusive reliance upon dearly estab-
lished law, and Justice Stevens suggested that Congress had congruent steps
in mind."5 The effect of this relatively subtle portion of the opinion is that
it directs practitioners to be alert to the body of law relied upon by the
federal court in its habeas review and to remind the federal court of its
statutory scope of review.
IV Epilogue
On November 14, 2000, Williams agreed to a negotiated sentencing
agreement whereby the Commonwealth agreed not to seek the death
penalty, and Williams forfeited any opportunity to be paroled.' Danville
Circuit Court Judge James F. Ingram accepted the agreement because it was
"in the interest of justice.""7 Williams, forty five-years-old, will spend the
rest of his life in prison.5"
Jeremy P. White
habeas court properly applies legal rules that are "dictated by precedent at the time the
defendant's conviction became final").
51. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (prohibiting federal courts from retroactively applying new
rules to a prisoner who is petitioning for federal habeas relief); see Williams, 120 S. Ct. at
1506.
52. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1523.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1506.
55. Id.
56. Brooke A. Masters, Deal Gets Inmate Off Death Row; U.S. High Court Intervened,
Citing Virginia Man's Deplorable Defense, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2000, at B1. Williams's
crimes occurred before January 1,1995 when defendants convicted of capital murder became
ineligible for parole. See VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 2000) (providing that '[alny
person sentenced to a term of incarceration for a felony offense committed on or after
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